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SOUNDS OF SCIENCE: COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT IN AI MUSIC GENERATOR
OUTPUTS
Eric Sunray ∗

ABSTRACT
The music business is no stranger to disruptive technology. The industry’s
apparent comeback from the devastating downturn caused by illegal file
sharing seems to have arrived just in time for what may be an even more
disruptive technological phenomenon: artificial intelligence (“AI”). Much has
been said about the implications of AI-generated music, ranging from issues of
ownership, to rights of publicity. However, there has been surprisingly little
discussion of infringement in the AI systems’ outputs. By examining the
functionality of AI music generators through the lens of de minimis use case
law, this paper will explain how the outputs of AI music generators potentially
infringe the exclusive reproduction right granted to musical work and sound
recording copyright owners. Going forward, courts and policymakers must not
ignore AI’s capacity to undermine our incentives for human authorship, and
craft rules that promote a mutually beneficial AI music ecosystem for
technology companies and copyright owners alike.
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“Now here we go dropping science, dropping it all over / like bumping around
the town like when you’re driving a Range Rover / expanding the horizons and
expanding the parameters / expanding the rhymes of sucker M.C. amateurs” 1
INTRODUCTION
The music industry is no stranger to disruptive technology. Indeed,
litigation following the ascendance of illegal file sharing services helped
dramatically shape a cornerstone of modern US secondary liability
jurisprudence. 2 However, for the music industry, the damage had already been
done. 3 Music sales and licensing revenue plunged by more than half in the
first decade of the twenty-first century, 4 making the industry’s rebound 5 in
recent years more cause for cautious optimism than celebration. 6
The music business’ supposed comeback seems to have arrived just in time
for what may be an even more disruptive technological phenomenon: the
proliferation of artificial intelligence (“AI”). 7 As applied to music, AI has
been met with intrigue and enthusiasm. 8 However, courts and policymakers
must be careful not to overlook the potentially devastating impacts that this
novel technology could have on human authorship.
BEASTIE BOYS, Sounds of Science, on PAUL’S BOUTIQUE (Capitol Records 1989).
See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913–914 (2005) (establishing
a rule whereby those who “intentionally induce. . .” copyright infringement may be held
secondarily liable); see also A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011, 1029 (9th
Cir. 2001) (finding Napster liable for contributory infringement and vicarious liability,
ultimately leading to the service’s demise in 2002).
3
See Stephen Dowling, Napster Turns 20: How It Changed the Music Industry, BBC
(May 31, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20190531-napster-turns-20-how-itchanged-the-music-industry (describing the peer-to-peer file sharing model as “an industrydestroying genie” that Napster “released. . . from the bottle forever”).
4
See David Goldman, Music’s Lost Decade: Sales Cut in Half, CNN (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster_music_industry/ (graphing the
precipitous loss in music industry revenue from 1999 to 2009).
5
See IFPI Global Music Report 2019, IFPI (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.ifpi.org/ifpiglobal-music-report-2019/ (reporting the fourth consecutive year of recorded music market
growth in 2019).
6
See Bill Hochberg, The Record Business is Partying Again, But Not Like It’s 1999,
FORBES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhochberg/2019/04/11/therecord-business-is-coming-back-but-its-not-1999-yet/?sh=55811de03257 (“[r]eports of a
full recovery by the record business may be exaggerated.”).
7
See Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html
(detailing the evolution of modern AI applications and how they have transformed Silicon
Valley).
8
See Alex Marshall, From Jingles to Pop Hits, A.I. is Music to Some Ears, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/arts/music/jukedeck-artificialintelligence-songwriting.html (suggesting AI could change the way we listen to music).
1
2
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Much has been said about the legal implications of AI music generators, 9
ranging from issues of ownership 10 to rights of publicity, 11 but there has been
surprisingly little discussion of infringements in the AI systems’ outputs. The
limited speculation on this question remains largely inconclusive in the popular
literature. 12 Accordingly, courts and policymakers will be forced to address
output infringements as AI music becomes increasingly sophisticated in the
coming years. 13
By examining the technical workings of AI music generators through the
lens of de minimis use case law, this Comment will explain how AI music
generator outputs potentially infringe the rights of music copyright holders.
Specifically, by up-sampling copyrighted works in finely encoded segments,
AI music generators create tapestries of coherent audio from the works they
ingest in training, thereby infringing the United States Copyright Act’s
reproduction right. 14 This moment presents an opportunity for technology
companies and the music industry to avoid repeating past mistakes by
addressing this new disruptive technology as partners, rather than opponents.
9
See generally Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399 (2017) (outlining the modern AI policy debate).
10 See Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardio, Authors and Machines, 34 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 343, 417–19 (2019) (suggesting the user of a generative machine who supplies
“some creative influence over the expressive contents of the resulting work” ought to have
authorship of the resulting work with the machine’s designer); see also James
Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Things as Computer-Authored Work – And It’s a Good
Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 403 (2016) (emphasizing how U.S. copyright law
does not recognize computer programs as authors); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1227–28
(1986) (endorsing vestment of rights in the AI user as being the “most practicable solution”
to the issue of AI-output ownership); but see Margot E. Kaminski, Authorship, Disrupted:
AI Authors In Copyright and First Amendment Law, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 589, 614 (2017)
(explaining how disruption of “romantic [i.e., human] authorship” in copyright and First
Amendment law predates the emergence of AI, thereby situating computer-authored works
within the bounds of U.S. copyright law); Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship:
Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395, 401 (2016) (arguing that recognition of
authorship in non-natural persons is consistent with first principles because U.S. copyright
law is predicated on “the protection of economic rather than moral rights”).
11 See, e.g., Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1788–1804 (2019)
(contrasting the costs and benefits of “deep fakes,” and proposing a combination of civil and
criminal penalties for abusers of this AI-powered technology).
12 See, e.g., Dani Deahl, We’ve Been Warned About AI and Music for Over 50 Years,
But No One’s Prepared, VERGE (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/17/
18299563/ai-algorithm-music-law-copyright-human (describing challenges facing the legal
system with regard to AI music as “a total legal cluster[expletive].”).
13 See, e.g., id. (discussing AI’s potential ability to work endlessly and mimic current
artists).
14 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2020) (reserving to the copyright owner the exclusive right to
“reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords”).
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Part I of this paper will offer a primer on AI and machine learning to explain
how the technology is currently being applied to music generation. Part II will
discuss the two copyrights that exist in every song and the state of the law as it
pertains to de minimis use of works protected by those copyrights. Part III of
this paper will apply the case law discussed in Part II to AI music generators,
arguing that under current law, AI music generators likely engage in pervasive
copyright infringement. Finally, Part III will conclude by considering the
long-term implications of adopting a permissive stance toward AI music
generators, and it will propose potential policy solutions that could engender a
more mutually beneficial AI music ecosystem.
I.

MACHINE LEARNING & AI MUSIC

AI has the world abuzz. Already, AI has proven itself capable of
performing intelligent tasks ranging from language processing 15 to cancer
detection. 16 It should come as no surprise, then, that researchers have also
been working to refine AI’s utility to the creative process – an area that has
also seen tremendous progress. 17 Considering the pace of creative AI systems
development, courts and policymakers must properly assess how generative AI
figures into existing legal frameworks, which first requires an understanding of
how AI functions.
Part I.A will describe the subfield of AI research known as machinelearning, and it will explain how it has transformed the prospects for
sophisticated AI applications. Part I.B will then discuss how AI music
generators employ machine learning to generate new musical compositions and
sound recordings.
A. Machine Learning
AI is a broad classification ascribed to several approaches to computer
science research on the subject of a machine’s capacity to act intelligently. 18
Modern AI research began in the 1950s, inspired by the hypothesis that the

See Lewis-Kraus, supra note 7.
See Neil Savage, How AI is Improving Cancer Diagnostics, NATURE (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00847-2 (describing how AI “can spot subtle
patterns that can easily be missed by humans.”).
17 See The Quest for AI Creativity, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/watson/advantagereports/future-of-artificial-intelligence/ai-creativity.html (last visited May 16, 2021)
(celebrating IBM Watson’s successful creation of a movie trailer).
18 STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN
APPROACH 1 (3d ed. 2010).
15
16
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learning process could be effectively replicated with computers. 19 Early AI
research primarily dealt with training computers to make intelligent choices
(e.g., moves in a game of checkers) by programming the system with an
internal feedback loop that allowed it to independently learn the result of each
decision it made. 20 However, this approach proved untenable when the vast
number of potential outcomes became too great for the system to comprehend
on its own. 21
In the 1980s, machine learning emerged as a subfield of AI research
grounded in statistics and mathematics. 22 Machine learning represented a vast
improvement over prior approaches to AI systems development for its use of
multi-layer neural networks. 23 Neural networks are algorithms designed to
mirror the human brain’s learning processes. 24 Two popular neural networkbased approaches to machine learning are generative adversarial networks
(“GANs”) and autoencoders. 25
GANs are a relatively new approach to using neural networks in generative
AI systems development. 26 GANs use two machine-learning models: one that
generates output at random to reflect the user’s command (the “generator”); the
other, a model that uses a pre-programmed dataset to critique the generator’s
output (the “discriminator”). 27 This feedback process is conducted reciprocally
until the discriminator can better detect the generator’s fake outputs, and the
generator can reliably pass the discriminator’s authenticity test. 28 As a result,
the GANs become capable of producing highly realistic outputs, but they often
fail to capture the full extent of the discriminator’s data distribution. 29
19 See C. E. Shannon et al., A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on
Artificial Intelligence, 27 AI MAGAZINE 4, 12 (1955) (proposing the first study into AI
systems development on the basis “that every aspect of learning or any other feature of
intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to
simulate it.”).
20 M. Tim Jones, A Beginner’s Guide to Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and
Cognitive Computing, IBM: DEVELOPER (June 1, 2017), https://developer.ibm.com/
articles/cc-beginner-guide-machine-learning-ai-cognitive/#machine-learning.
21 See id. (using as an example a game of tic-tac-toe: “[a]t the start of the game there are
nine possible moves . . . The full tree of moves for tic-tac-toe contains . . . 362,880 nodes.”).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Chris Nicholson, A Beginner’s Guide to Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs),
PATHMIND, https://wiki.pathmind.com/generative-adversarial-network-gan (last visited May
16, 2021).
26 See Ian J. Goodfellow et al., Generative Adversarial Nets, ARXIV (June 10, 2014),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1406.2661.pdf (proposing the GAN as a new framework for estimating
generative models in 2014).
27 Nicholson, supra note 25.
28 Id.
29 Sander Dieleman, Generating Music in the Waveform Domain, GITHUB (Mar. 24,
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Another noteworthy neural network that takes a different approach to
generative modeling is the autoencoder. 30 Autoencoders ingest input data,
compress them into discrete coded segments, and then attempt to reconstruct
the input data through a decoding process. 31 By examining discrepancies
between the input and output layers, the system can refine its encoding process
to extract only the input data’s most relevant elements. 32 The goal is to
strengthen the network’s ability to independently encode large datasets, such
that those encoded segments can be subsequently used to generate
unrecognizable, authentic-sounding outputs. 33
GANs and autoencoders represent two promising approaches to using neural
networks for creative expression. 34 One of the most remarkable uses of neural
networks to date is in the creation of deepfakes, 35 which have been put to both
comical 36 and potentially nefarious 37 uses. Recent breakthroughs in AI music
generator research suggest that neural networks may have a similarly profound
effect on the future of music creation and consumption. 38 The next subsection
will explore the ways that neural networks are being applied to artificial music
generation.

2020), https://benanne.github.io/2020/03/24/audio-generation.html#fnref:pixelcnn.
30 Autoencoder, DEEPAI, https://deepai.org/machine-learning-glossary-andterms/autoencoder (last visited May 16, 2021).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See id. (explaining that autoencoders could theoretically generate an image of, e.g., a
flying housecat, based solely on the system’s refined codes for inputs like “houses” and
“flying”).
34 Id.
35 See Grace Shao, What ‘Deepfakes’ Are and How They Are Dangerous, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/what-is-deepfake-and-how-it-might-be-dangerous.html
(last updated Jan. 17, 2020) (explaining that deepfakes are artificial videos made through
deep learning processes designed to believably simulate the appearance and vocal
characteristics of real individuals).
36 See Andy Baio, With Questionable Copyright Claim, Jay-Z Orders Deepfake Audio
Parodies Off YouTube, WAXY (Apr. 28, 2020), https://waxy.org/2020/04/jay-z-ordersdeepfake-audio-parodies-off-youtube/ (describing videos posted to YouTube containing
“Bill Clinton reciting ‘Baby Got Back,’” and “JFK touting the intellectual merits of Rick
and Morty.”).
37 See Kaylee Fagan, A Viral Video That Appeared to Show Obama Calling Trump a
‘Dips—’ Shows a Disturbing New Trend Called ‘Deepfakes’, INSIDER (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/obama-deepfake-video-insulting-trump-2018-4
(explaining that widely available deepfake software has already been used to believably
mimic the likeness of prominent political figures, and to insert celebrity faces into
pornographic videos).
38 See Marshall, supra note 8 (speculating that AI will change the way we listen to
music by eventually enabling computers to compose music responsively while “[playing] a
game,” or “going for a run,”).
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B. AI Music
Applying AI technology to music is nothing new. Automatic music
generation can be traced back to the earliest days of AI research. 39 Further, AI
already aides the modern music industry by performing functions ranging from
talent discovery 40 to playlist curation. 41
However, the last few years have constituted a renaissance in machinelearning music generation. 42 Leading technology companies like Google 43 and
IBM 44 have thrown their hats into the machine-learning music space. Even
anonymous AI hobbyists have used homemade algorithms to catch the
attention of international superstars (or, more accurately, their lawyers). 45
Among the most novel developments in machine-learning music generation
has been the practice of training generative AI models on large corpora of raw
audio. 46 This approach allows the model to account for nuances in recorded
music (e.g., timbre, dynamics, etc.) that cannot be discovered in inherently
limited symbolic training material. 47 When trained on enough raw audio, the
39 See L. A. Hiller, Jr. & L. M. Isaacson, Musical Composition with a High-Speed
Digital Computer, 6 J. AUDIO ENG’G SOC. 154, 154–160 (1958) (reporting on the
development of a technique for “writing music by means of automatic high-speed digital
computers”).
40 See Ryan Middleton, Industry Focus: ASAII Co-Founder, Austin Chen Talks Using
Data A&R Hidden Talent, MAGNETIC MAG., https://www.magneticmag.com/2017/10/
industry-focus-asaii-co-founder-austin-chen-talks-using-data-a-r-hidden-talent/ (last updated
Aug. 22, 2018) (profiling Asaii, a new company that uses AI to discover hidden talent).
41 See Jonathan Vanian, How A.I. is Playing a Bigger Role in Music Streaming Than
You Ever Imagined, FORTUNE (Oct. 1, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/10/01/sonos-spotifyiheartradio-artificial-intelligence/ (examining AI’s application to listener trend analysis).
42 See Andrew R. Chow, There’s a Wide-Open Horizon of Possibility.’ Musicians Are
Using AI to Create Otherwise Impossible New Songs, TIME (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://time.com/5774723/ai-music/.
43 See Aaron van den Oord & Sander Dieleman, WaveNet: A Generative Model for Raw
Audio, DEEPMIND (Sept. 8, 2016), https://deepmind.com/blog/article/wavenet-generativemodel-raw-audio (introducing WaveNet, a generative model capable of synthesizing audio
signals like human voice and music).
44 See Kelly Shi, Beats By AI, IBM: RES. PROJECTS BLOG (July 27, 2016),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2016/07/beats-by-ai/ (introducing Watson Beat, a
cognitive technology trained to understand the nuances and characteristics of all thirty music
keys).
45 See Baio, supra note 36 (reporting that Roc Nation filed a takedown notice with
YouTube alleging copyright infringement in two deepfake videos created by “training a
model with a large corpus of . . . Jay-Z songs and lyrics”).
46 See Prafulla Dhariwal et al., Jukebox, OPENAI (Apr. 30, 2020), https://openai.com/
blog/jukebox/ (introducing Jukebox, a neural net that generates music as raw audio using a
model trained on a dataset of 1.2 million songs taken from the web).
47 Id. A critical shortcoming of previous generative models was their reliance on
symbolic representations like musical instrument digital interface (“MIDI”) files. MIDI is a
communications protocol that essentially functions as a digital signal that instructs
electronic instruments on which sounds to produce. Like piano rolls that instruct player
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model can generate music closely resembling the unique qualities of whichever
artist(s) and/or genre(s) the user selects. 48
This great leap forward is made possible by the use of neural networks
called variational autoencoders (“VAEs”), 49 which compress the cumbersome
sequences of raw audio in lower-dimensional spaces where they can be
efficiently processed without sacrificing structural perceptibility. 50 The VAEs
allow the audio to be analyzed at multiple compression levels 51 to develop a
holistic understanding of what is occurring in the music. 52
Once the model has learned about the distribution of musical elements in
these compressed spaces, it approximates how they would be arranged in a
new sample and rebuilds them from the ground up. 53 In other words, the
model reacts to the user’s inputs (i.e., artist, style, genre, etc.) by predicting
how the respective musical elements should be redistributed, thereby
generating a sample that is subsequently refined in stages from low-to-high
levels of musical detail (“up-sampling”). 54 Once the code is up-sampled to its
most detailed level of musical abstraction, it is decoded back into raw audio,
resulting in a new song containing the user’s desired qualities. 55
In sum, when a generative model is engaged to make a new work, the audio
that manifests as output is merely a tapestry of up-sampled sound recording
fragments manipulated to resemble something ostensibly novel. 56 Thus,
characterizing the AI generator’s output as “original” is misleading, because
doing so disregards the role that reproduction of copyrighted works plays in
generating the sample. Accordingly, we must assess whether the mechanics of
machine-learning music generators can be reconciled with the protections

pianos on basic functions such as which keys to strike and for how long, MIDI signals can
only provide electronic instruments with basic instructions like pitch, duration, and velocity.
Id.
48 Id.
49 See Nicholson, supra note 25 (explaining that VAEs “are capable of both
compressing data like an autoencoder and synthesizing data like a GAN”).
50 Jukebox, supra note 46; see also Devin Coldewey, OpenAI’s New Experiments in
Music Generation Create an Uncanny Valley Elvis, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/30/openais-new-experiments-in-music-generation-createan-uncanny-valley-elvis/.
51 Coldewey, supra note 50. At the first compression level (8x), the encoded audio still
possesses a relatively high degree of detail. The second compression level (32x) retains less
quality than the first, and the third level (128x) only retains the most basic musical
information. Id.
52 Jukebox, supra note 46.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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afforded creative authors under the Copyright Act. Part II will describe the
two copyright interests attached to every song and how their infringements are
adjudicated.
II. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF MUSICAL WORKS & SOUND
RECORDINGS
The Copyright Act provides for nine distinct categories of copyrightable
subject matter. 57 Section 102(a)(2) sets forth the “musical work” category,
which includes a song’s basic structural elements, such as chord progression,
melody, and “any accompanying words.” 58 Section 102(a)(7) provides for the
“sound recording” category, 59 which applies only to fixed sounds (e.g., an
artist’s recorded performance of a musical work). 60 Thus, unlike any other
form of creative expression, recorded music is unique in that each song
necessarily contains two forms of copyrightable subject matter. 61 Despite their
interrelated natures, this distinction suggests that assessing alleged
infringements of a given song may not entail the same analytical approach for
both copyrights, nor will the respective analyses necessarily arrive at the same
conclusion. 62
Among the most basic rights reserved to the copyright owner is the
reproduction right. 63 This fundamental feature of our copyright laws
constitutes one of the simplest tools we employ to realize the flourishing
creative society envisioned under the Constitution. 64 To find infringement of
the reproduction right, a plaintiff must (1) prove ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) establish that the defendant “copied” the work at issue. 65

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990).
Id. § (a)(2).
59 Id. § (a)(7).
60 See id. § 101 (defining a “sound recording” as “the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds”).
61 Copyrightable Subject Matter, DIG. MEDIA L. PROJECT (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/copyrightable-subject-matter.
62 See Oren Bracha, Not De Minimis: (Improper) Appropriation in Copyright, 68 AM.
U. L. REV. 139, 147 (2018) (explaining that “one cannot infringe the sound recording
copyright – as opposed to the copyright in the underlying musical composition – by
recording an independent version of the song, no matter how similar to the original
recording the new version is”).
63 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (providing for the copyright owner’s exclusive right to
reproduce his work in copies or phonorecords).
64 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (seeking “[t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries”).
65 Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1977).
57
58
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To establish copying by the defendant, the plaintiff must prove not only that
his work was copied, 66 but that the alleged copying constitutes an improper
appropriation of the work. 67 Unfortunately, the improper appropriation aspect
of the infringement inquiry is often conflated with the substantial similarity
analysis conducted to assess actual copying. 68 Judge Learned Hand’s 1930
“abstractions test” best illustrates the essence of improper appropriation. 69 The
abstractions test explains that, in every work, there is a spectrum of protectable
expression ranging from that which is undeniably protected by a copyright in
the work (e.g., a uniquely constructed scene in a film, or a particular piece of
dialogue), to that which is so general it merely constitutes the author’s ideas
(e.g., common themes in stories, like overcoming adversity to find love,
wealth, etc.), which have never fallen within copyright’s purview. 70 Since
1930, new technologies and categories of copyrightable subject matter have
challenged this approach to analyzing improper appropriations based on levels
of abstraction, but the analysis nonetheless still attempts to honor this
principle. 71
Thus, the reproduction right is not absolute. The Second Circuit has noted
that “trivial copying is a significant part of modern life. Most honest citizens in
the world engage . . . in trivial copying that . . . would technically constitute a
violation of the law.” 72 Additionally, many forms of admitted “copying” fall
66 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (explaining that answering
the question of whether the plaintiff’s work was copied, in the first analysis, may be shown
directly, via admission, or circumstantially, by a sufficient showing of the defendant’s (1)
access to the plaintiff’s work, combined with the existence of (2) substantial similarities
between the original work and the alleged copy).
67 Id.
68 See Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 719, 720–21 (2010) (explaining that the substantial similarity inquiry
conducted to establish improper appropriation is often misunderstood by courts to be a
generalized substantial similarity analysis, which misses the purpose of the inquiry, i.e., to
ascertain whether what was copied was unlawful).
69 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (explaining
that “[u]pon any work, . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of
its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from
their expression, his property is never extended.”).
70 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990) (stating that copyright protection does not
“extend to any idea, . . . regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work”).
71 See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–10 (2d Cir.
1992) (articulating the “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test to assess substantial
similarity in alleged software copying).
72 Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001).
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within the bounds of exceptions that permit innocent reproductions which, if
restricted, would not promote the utilitarian purposes of copyright. 73
The subsections that follow will focus on an exception to the copyright
owner’s exclusive rights known as de minimis use. De minimis is a principle
premised on the idea that “the law does not concern itself with trifles.” 74 To be
used sparingly, de minimis seeks to avoid the pursuit of trivial claims and
enforcement of their potentially disproportionate penalties. 75 It is difficult to
ascertain exactly what “trifles” are when considering the de minimis
exception. 76 Applied to music, this has generally meant appropriations of
short, unrecognizable musical segments. 77 However, as the subsections that
follow will demonstrate, courts have taken inconsistent approaches to de
minimis musical work and sound recording uses. 78
Courts still have yet to weigh in on the legality of AI music generator
outputs, but the case law on de minimis uses of musical works and sound
recordings is instructive. 79 Subsection A will focus on de minimis uses of
musical works to explain that there is a well-established de minimis exception
for unrecognizable musical composition appropriations. Next, subsection B
will examine de minimis uses of sound recordings to explain that, here, courts
are split; however, there has historically been a jurisprudential tendency toward
“sound recording exceptionalism.” 80
73 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1990) (describing the fair use doctrine—a multi-factor test
used to determine whether a particular use, on balance, should be deemed permissible in
light of the goals of copyright).
74 Bracha, supra note 62, at 158.
75 See id. (explaining that “de minimis . . . corrects on the margin, an unfortunate side
effect of the generality of legal rules: the fact that in a small subset of cases that fall within
the ambit of such rules the cost of enforcement so overwhelmingly outweighs its benefit that
enforcing the rules will be clearly detrimental.”).
76 See 4 M. B. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2] (2020)
(introducing the concept of “fragmented literal similarity”). The leading treatise on
copyright explains that, where literal similarities exist, there is no need to consider levels of
abstraction, because literal similarities necessarily entail the expression of ideas. Instead,
the question becomes whether such similarities are substantial enough to constitute an
infringement. Id.
77 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that “meager
and fragmentary” takings are de minimis where the “average audience would not recognize
the appropriation”).
78 See infra Part II.
79 See supra Part I.B (describing how the process by which AI music generators create
new works is necessarily dependent on the reproduction of potentially unrecognizable sound
recording fragments).
80 See Bracha, supra note 62, at 145 (defining sound recording exceptionalism as the
proposition that “copyright in recorded sounds is unique because, unlike copyright in any
other subject matter, it is infringed upon copying with no additional requirement of
improper appropriation.”) (quoting Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d
792, 800–01 (6th Cir. 2005)).
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A. Musical Works
The copyright in a musical work protects the essence of the song. Broadly
speaking, just twelve notes constitute the building blocks of every composition
we know, 81 from Beethoven to the Beatles. An inherently limited musical
palette means that composers must often make use of the same compositional
elements, such as chord progressions, rhythms, and common melodic
intervals. 82 Thus, while musical work copyrights will be conferred upon
multiple compositions containing many of the same musical themes, protection
cannot extend to every constituent element of a given song. 83
Accordingly, the nature of musical works makes assessing substantial
similarity essential to the infringement inquiry. For instance, granting a
monopoly to one composer over a three-note melody, without more, would
unduly constrain the public’s ability to utilize an already limited selection of
notes in subsequent compositions. 84 Therefore, when generic features of a
work are used without authorization, the de minimis exception would likely
serve to permit such uses as non-infringing. 85 The difficulty is determining
where to draw the line between de minimis and substantial appropriations. 86
The Ninth Circuit articulated an approach to de minimis uses of
compositions that attempts to sensibly capture the intended scope of protection
in a musical work copyright. 87 The rule provides that the de minimis inquiry
turns on whether the average audience would recognize the appropriation. 88 In
Fisher v. Dees, a parodist appropriated six bars of music, constituting the main

81

ALLEN FORTE, TONAL HARMONY IN CONCEPT AND PRACTICE 4–5 (Holt et al., 3d ed.

1979).
82 See Alan White, 73 Songs You Can Play with the Same Four Chords, BUZZFEED
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alanwhite/73-songs-you-can-play-with-thesame-four-chords (listing dozens of famous pop songs premised on the same chord
progression).
83 See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967)
(explaining that allowing one party to copyright a “handful of forms” could exhaust all
possible future use).
84 See id. at 679 (refusing to recognize copyright as “a game of chess in which the
public can be checkmated.”).
85 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 76, at § 13.03[A][2][a] (explaining that, in the
literary realm, “[o]rdinarily, the importance of but one line . . . would be regarded as de
minimis, not justifying a finding of substantial similarity.”).
86 See id. (noting that “[n]o easy rule of thumb can be stated as to the quantum of
fragmented literal similarity permitted without crossing the line of substantial similarity.”).
87 See generally Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1986); see generally
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).
88 See Fisher 794 F.2d at 434 n.2 (noting that “a taking is considered de minimis only if
it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the
appropriation.”).
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theme from the plaintiffs’ composition. 89 The court roundly rejected the
parodist’s de minimis defense, reasoning that the appropriation would be
immediately recognizable to those familiar with the original work. 90 Thus, the
appropriated segment, however brief, was substantial enough to disqualify the
parodist from de minimis protection. 91
By contrast, Newton v. Diamond defined the opposite boundary to the Ninth
Circuit’s recognition standard. 92 In Newton, the court had to determine
whether use of a licensed sound recording sample also required a license for its
underlying musical work. 93 Defendants were members of the hip-hop group
Beastie Boys, who sampled a six-second, three-note segment from a jazz
record. 94 Beastie Boys properly obtained a license to sample the sound
recording from the relevant copyright owner (ECM Records), but the
plaintiff—jazz flutist James Newton —alleged infringement of his copyright in
the underlying musical work. 95
Conceptually, it is difficult to distinguish between performative and
compositional elements. The court could not consider Newton’s unique
performance style in its analysis, because the sole basis for the infringement
claim was Beastie Boys’ unauthorized use of the composition. 96 Ironically,
Newton’s experts actually undermined his case by focusing on his technique,
instead of the song’s generic score. 97 When stripped of Newton’s performative
contributions, the segment of allegedly appropriated composition merely
amounted to two distinct notes, a single scale-degree apart, alternated over a
sustained C note. 98
Having determined the nature of Newton’s musical work copyright, the
court was left to decide whether Beastie Boys’ unauthorized appropriation was
substantial enough to sustain the infringement claim. 99 Quantitatively, very
little had been appropriated – the segment constituted just three notes in a score

Id. at 434.
See id. at 434 n.2 (explaining that a parodist’s purposes would not be achieved by
appropriating anything less than a portion substantial enough to conjure thoughts of the
original work in the listener’s mind).
91 Id. at 434, 440.
92 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1190.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1191.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1193–94.
97 See id. at 1194 (noting how Newton’s experts conceded the point that improvisational
styles like jazz often contain simple, sparsely scored compositions, because it is assumed
that performers will take creative liberties in their performances).
98 See id. (explaining that the scope of Newton’s copyright extends only to the
“elements that he fixed in a tangible medium – those that he wrote on the score.”).
99 Id.
89
90
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that called for “between 180 and 270 seconds of improvisation.” 100
Qualitatively, the court found that there was nothing distinctive about this
segment of the composition relative to the rest of the score. 101 Therefore, the
court held that Beastie Boys’ use of the composition was de minimis, because
“an average audience would not discern Newton’s hand as a composer, . . .
from Beastie Boys’ use of the sample.” 102
Fisher and Newton nicely delineate the parameters of the Ninth Circuit’s de
minimis recognition standard as applied to musical works. 103 However, the
copyright law’s long-standing requirement of demonstrating substantial
similarities in infringement inquiries makes the foregoing cases more
illustrative than controversial. 104 Nonetheless, technological progress routinely
calls into question the utility of well-established copyright doctrines. 105
Accordingly, the next subpart will examine the de minimis exception’s
compatibility with one such development in the narrative of copyright law:
digital sampling of sound recordings.
B. Sound Recordings
The Copyright Act has provided for federal protection of sound recordings
since 1972. 106 Congress recognized a need to curtail the piracy of
phonorecords, which at the time contributed to an estimated loss of
approximately one-third of all legitimate tape sales value on an annualized

Id. at 1195.
See id. at 1196 (relying on the Beastie Boys’ expert’s testimony, which concluded
that “the compositional elements of the sampled section do not represent the heart or the
hook of the ‘Choir’ composition, but rather are ‘simple, minimal and insignificant.’”).
102 Id.
103 Compare Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting that six bars
of music were de minimis: “a taking is considered de minimis only if it is so meager and
fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the appropriation”), with
Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195–96 (establishing that the segment constituted just three notes in a
score that called for “between 180 and 270 seconds of improvisation,” which does “not
represent the heart or the hook of the ‘Choir’ composition, but rather are ‘simple, minimal
and insignificant.’”).
104 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 76, at § 13.03[A][2][b] (2020) (explaining that
the “traditional standards of copyright law – which, for decades prior to adoption of the
1976 Act and unceasingly in the decades since, has included the requirement of substantial
similarity.”).
105 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417–18
(1984) (questioning established notions of secondary liability in the context of a new
technology capable of “substantial non-infringing uses.”).
106 See Sound Recording Amendment Act, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971)
(amending the Copyright Act to extend protection against “unauthorized duplication and
piracy of sound recording, and for other purposes.”).
100
101
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basis. 107 Further, phonorecord piracy translated into devastating losses for
performers, musicians, and those who relied on the tax revenue it displaced. 108
Remarkably, this momentous addition to the copyright laws came barely a
decade before the birth of hip-hop music, which made an art form out of sound
recording appropriation. 109 By the late 1980s, hip-hop artists were using
widely available digital sampling 110 equipment to create collages of sound
from potentially hundreds of pre-existing sound recordings. 111 Some have
described this practice as born out of necessity. 112 Others have questioned
digital sampling’s artistic merits, arguing it is simply lazy authorship. 113
Regardless of one’s personal attitude toward sound recording appropriation as
an artform, history has demonstrated that digital sampling is a phenomenon
that is here to stay. 114
The ubiquity of digital sampling in the 1980s posed new legal challenges
that continue to vex courts and legal scholars. As an initial matter, the
Copyright Act does not extend the same scope of exclusive rights to sound
recordings as it does to other forms of copyrightable subject matter, 115 nor does
it prohibit third parties from imitating sound recordings so long as the new
sounds are independently fixed. 116 In other words, a copyrighted sound
recording cannot be infringed by imitation, unless it is the actual sounds

H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 1–2 (1971).
Id. at 2.
109 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing,
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 558 (2006) (defining hip-hop as a
musical style that uses rhythmic backgrounds characterized by manipulation of pre-existing
recordings).
110 See Mary B. Percifull, Digital Sampling: Creative or Just Plain “CHEEZ-OID?”, 42
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1263, 1263 (1992) (describing “digital sampling” as a process
whereby “sounds are taken from a source, either live or recorded,” such that “[a] musician
can use a library of samples to create virtually any type of recording instead of hiring
individual instrumentalists to play each part.”).
111 Julian Azran, Bring Back the Noise: How Cariou v. Prince Will Revitalize Sampling,
38 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 69, 72 (2014).
112 See Melissa Eckhause, Digital Sampling v. Appropriation Art: Why Is One Stealing
and the Other Fair Use? A Proposal for a Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Digital
Music Sampling, 84 MO. L. REV. 371, 378–79 (2019) (explaining that artists who digitally
sampled often did so because they lacked the resources to obtain instruments, music lessons,
and the technical know-how to recreate the sounds they sought to emulate).
113 See COPYRIGHT CRIMINALS, (PBS 2009) (containing an interview with acclaimed
music producer Steve Albini in which he characterizes sampling as “lazy and uncool.”).
114 See Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling, Intermediate Copying,
Fair Use, 3 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 271, 278 (1996) (describing digital sampling as “so
pervasive that many musicians and engineers . . . regard it as being indispensable in the
music industry.”).
115 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a)–(b) (1990) (limiting the exclusive rights in sound recordings
to “the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106”).
116 Id. at (b).
107
108
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themselves that are reproduced or manipulated. 117 This divergence from the
scope of protection granted to other copyrightable subject matter has served to
confound understandings of the traditional infringement analysis, which has
long been interpreted by courts, scholars, and practitioners as turning on the
existence of substantial similarities. 118 As the cases that follow will
demonstrate, courts have struggled to establish consistent legal standards that
satisfy the respective interests of copyright owners and those who rely on
digital sampling.
1.

Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records

The first case to address digital sound recording sampling was Grand
Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records (“Grand Upright”) in 1991. 119
In Grand Upright, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction against, inter
alia, the rapper Biz Markie for his use of three words and a short digital
sample of the plaintiff’s song “Alone Again (Naturally).” 120 The Southern
District of New York immediately characterized the defendant’s actions as
theft 121 and centered its analysis on establishing the plaintiff’s ownership of the
song’s copyrights. 122 Having found that the plaintiff held a valid copyright in
the sampled sound recording, the court admonished the defendant’s actions,
going as far as to recommend the matter to the United States Attorney for
criminal prosecution. 123
The outcome in Grand Upright was a stunning vindication of sound
recording exceptionalism. 124 However, many have since criticized Grand
Upright for its lack of reasoning on the copying prong in the infringement

Id.
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 76, at § 13.03[A][2][b] (2020) (noting that
influential digital sampling cases have called into question the notion that, “[o]n general
principles, . . . digitally sampling prior music to use in a new composition should not be
subject to any special analysis: to the extent that the resulting product is substantially similar
to the sampled original, liability should result.”).
119 Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
120 Id. at 183.
121 Id. (quoting the Old Testament’s prohibition on stealing in the Book of Exodus).
122 Id. at 183–85 (reasoning that the certificates of copyright and transfer documents,
testimony of the acknowledged songwriter and first performer, and the defendant’s
unsuccessful prior attempts to secure a license from the plaintiff all served as evidence that
the plaintiff held valid copyrights in the works).
123 Id. at 185.
124 See id. (noting that the defendant’s conduct in this case not only violated the laws of
the United States, but also the Seventh Commandment).
117
118
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analysis. 125 The court did not assess, for example, whether the relatively short
sample met the qualitative substantiality requirement for unlawfulness. 126 In
other words, the court conducted its infringement inquiry without
contemplating whether the work had been improperly appropriated; it was
satisfied in its conclusion merely knowing that a portion of the work was used
without authorization. 127
The lack of clear guidance in Grand Upright led artists and record
companies to assume that negotiating a license was the safest approach to
digital sampling. 128 Cultural historians have lamented the case for how it
served to dilute hip-hop’s authentic, spontaneous, and transgressive nature. 129
Another practical effect of Grand Upright was that digital sampling became a
creative tool reserved only to those who could afford the high licensing fees. 130
Most digital sampling disputes today are resolved in private settlements,
which deny courts the opportunity to provide more meaningful guidance. 131
However, two influential cases in the last fifteen years have revisited the issue
and have offered nuanced assessments of what should occur in a sound
recording infringement analysis. 132 Unfortunately, the courts’ respective
interpretations of the Copyright Act established contradictory legal rules,
resulting in a circuit split.
2.

The Circuit Split Between the Sixth & Ninth Circuits
After Grand Upright, de minimis use of sound recordings was not truly

125 See Carl A. Falstrom, Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner
Bros. Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 359, 362 (1994) (noting that the Grand Upright case had the potential to be a
landmark decision but, in reality, is of little precedential value).
126 See id. Beyond the court’s choice to disregard this aspect of the infringement
analysis, defendant’s counsel may have also contributed to the opinion’s lack of reasoning
by failing to assert some common defenses. Id. Had, for example, fair use been asserted, the
court would have had to consider, inter alia, the substantiality of the portion copied. Id. It is
unclear whether a fair use defense would have changed the dispute’s outcome, but it would
have at least forced the court to tease out its justification for ruling in a manner that
effectively pulled the rug out from under digital sampling-reliant artforms.
127 Id. at 379 (noting that not all appropriation is wrong in the sampling context, and
some artists just want to incorporate a particular sound into their music).
128 Azran, supra note 111, at 73.
129 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS & COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 143 (2001) (noting that, “[w]hat sampling
did occur in the late 1990s was non-transgressive, nonthreatening, and too often clumsy and
obvious.”).
130 Azran, supra note 111, at 73–74.
131 Percifull, supra note 110, at 1285.
132 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005);
see also VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016).
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reconsidered until 2005, when the Sixth Circuit decided Bridgeport Music, Inc.
v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport”). 133 Bridgeport involved the use of a foursecond, three-note sample from the song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” by
George Clinton, Jr. and the Funkadelics, in the rap song “100 Miles and
Runnin’,” which was featured on the soundtrack to a film called I Got the
Hook Up. 134 The plaintiff record company, claiming ownership over the
digitally sampled sound recording, argued that no improper appropriation or de
minimis inquiry is necessary where the defendant does not dispute having
digitally sampled a sound recording. 135 The court ultimately agreed with the
plaintiff and rejected the district court’s determination that the sample did not
“rise to the level of a legally cognizable appropriation.” 136
The court focused on a literal interpretation of a single word in Section
114(b) of the Copyright Act to support its conclusion. 137 Section 114(b) states
that the exclusive reproduction and derivative work rights in sound recordings
“do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds . . .” 138 By
comparison, the parallel language within the Sound Recording Act of 1971—
codified in the previous version of the Copyright Act—did not include the
word “entirely[.]” 139 Thus, the court read the 1976 Copyright Act’s deliberate
inclusion of the word “entirely” as suggesting that Congress intended for the
sound recording owner to have “the exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own
recording.” 140 In other words, the court interpreted “entirely” to imply that
Congress never intended exceptions for miniscule appropriations, because
nothing short of complete independent fixation would satisfy a literal reading
of the statute. 141
The thrust of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning was that, unlike most other forms
of copyrightable expression, even a seemingly negligible digital sample
constitutes a taking of something valuable and must therefore be licensed. 142
Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 793.
Id. at 795–96.
135 Id. at 798.
136 See id. at 797 (quoting the district court’s opinion, which conducted an improper
appropriation inquiry in its analysis, unlike the Southern District of New York in Grand
Upright).
137 Id. at 799.
138 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (emphasis added).
139 See Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 800–01 (noting that the former 17 U.S.C. §
1(f) did not extend the reproduction and derivative work rights to “duplication of another
sound recording that is an independent fixation of other [sounds.]”).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 801.
142 Id. at 801–02 (explaining that the decision to sample, rather than independently fix
the desired sounds, implies that the sample adds value by either saving money on the cost of
133
134
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The court explained that the essence of a sound recording is not the song, but
rather how the various sounds exist within their fixed medium. 143 Thus, a
digital sample can be viewed as akin to a physical taking, because the sounds
are lifted directly from the medium itself. 144 In sum, Bridgeport further
bolstered the notion of sound recording exceptionalism by establishing a
bright-line rule: “Get a license or do not sample.” 145
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit announced a different rule regarding de
minimis use of sound recordings when it decided VMG Salsoul, LLC v.
Ciccone (“Ciccone”) in 2016. 146 Ciccone involved the use of a single horn
sample, lasting less than a second, from the song “Ooh I Love It (Love
Break),” which was reproduced in Madonna’s hit song “Vogue.” 147
Madonna’s producer, Shep Pettibone, was involved in the recording of both
songs. 148 However, the plaintiff owned the copyrights to the sampled work,
and alleged infringement against, inter alia, Madonna and Pettibone for their
unauthorized reproduction of the .23-second horn blast from the plaintiff’s
recording. 149 Thus, the court had to decide whether it would adopt the Sixth
Circuit’s bright-line rule from Bridgeport, or maintain the de minimis
exception for sound recordings. 150
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning involved a close, literal reading of the
Copyright Act and its legislative history. 151 First, the court noted that neither
Section 102(a), nor Section 106 suggest an intent for differential treatment of
sound recordings where de minimis copying is concerned. 152 Second, a House
Report with respect to Section 114(b) states that “infringement takes place
whenever . . . any substantial portion of the actual sounds . . . are
reproduced.” 153 Thus, inclusion of the word “substantial” in the House Report
persuaded the court that Congress intended for the de minimis exception to
apply to sound recordings, just as it applies to other categories of copyrightable

hiring musicians to recreate the sounds, or by enriching the quality of the new work with
sound that can only be captured by reproducing the original recording).
143 Id. at 802.
144 See id. (distinguishing the concept of a physical taking from an intellectual one).
145 Id. at 801.
146 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that
the de minimis exception applies to sound recording copyright infringement claims, just as it
does to all other categories of copyrightable subject matter).
147 Id. at 875.
148 Id. at 874.
149 Id.
150 See id. at 880 (explaining that the plaintiff urged the court to follow Bridgeport’s
bright line rule).
151 Id. at 881–83, 887.
152 Id. at 881–82.
153 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976) (emphasis added).
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subject matter. 154
The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded that Congress intended for sound
recordings to enjoy a unique scope of protection. 155 The court emphasized that
substantiality of the portion copied is a well-established requirement for
copyright infringement. 156 Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s view that something
of value is taken whenever a sound recording is copied, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that a copier does not benefit from the original artist’s expression
when the public cannot recognize the appropriation. 157 Further, the lack of
cases demonstrating adherence to Bridgeport (save for district courts within
the Sixth Circuit that are bound to do so) bolstered the court’s belief that the de
minimis exception should be applied consistently, even to cases of digital
sampling. 158
Mindful that circuit splits should not be undertaken lightly, the court issued
a fulsome rebuttal of Bridgeport in an attempt to justify its departure from the
Sixth Circuit’s well-established—albeit non-binding—precedent. 159 Contrary
to the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the word “entirely” in Section 114(b),
the Ninth Circuit inferred that the abundance of limitative language in the
provision (“exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in a sound recording . .
. do not extend . . . do not apply”) did not indicate an intent to expand the
scope of protection for sound recordings. 160 Further, the court was not
persuaded by the Sixth Circuit’s distinction between physical and intellectual
takings, which it reasoned could just as easily be applied to other classes of
artistic works that have always been subject to the de minimis exception (e.g.,
photographs). 161 Accordingly, the court was compelled to announce its own
rule, in contravention of the Sixth Circuit. 162
The court admitted that an unfortunate effect of contradictory rules between
the circuits is that copyright owners will enjoy different degrees of protection
VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 884.
Id. at 884–85.
156 Id. at 880–81 (citing 4 M. B. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[A][2][a] (2020)).
157 See id. at 880–881 (explaining that the artist’s legally protected interest is intrinsically
linked to the public’s appreciation for – and recognition of – the work) (citing Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)).
158 See id. at 881 (noting how Bridgeport is an outlier among courts that consistently
apply the de minimis rule in copyright infringement cases).
159 See id. at 886 (acknowledging the likely unfortunate consequences of its decision but
emphasizing that courts cannot be expected to blindly follow their sister circuits’
unpersuasive reasoning).
160 Id. at 883.
161 Id. at 885.
162 See id. at 886 (noting that “the goal of avoiding a circuit split cannot override [the
court’s] independent duty to determine congressional intent.”).
154
155
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depending on where they are located in the country. 163 Regrettably, the
inconsistent rules established in the foregoing cases divide two of the country’s
primary music markets, which cannot be easily delinked: Nashville, under the
Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction; and Los Angeles, under the Ninth Circuit’s. 164 To
be clear, this subsection’s purpose is not to question the wisdom of Grand
Upright, Bridgeport, or Ciccone. Divining congressional intent from statutory
language that may not have contemplated the particular activity at issue is no
simple task. Nonetheless, in the absence of further guidance from Congress,
the inconsistent rules regarding de minimis use of sound recordings provide a
shaky foundation upon which we must consider novel technologies that engage
in increasingly pernicious forms of digital sampling.
III. ANALYSIS
Although research into AI music generation had already been ongoing for
two decades prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, it is unlikely
that Congress envisioned machine learning as an approach to sophisticated
music generation. 165 The courts’ apparent inability to settle on a consistent
reading of the Copyright Act with regard to digital sampling foreshadows the
interpretive challenges that lie ahead in the AI era. 166 Society’s tenuous
understanding of Congress’ intent in Section 114(b) will once again be tested
by the peculiarities of algorithm-based music generators, which can be fairly
described as engaging in a form of digital sampling. 167 Additionally, the
variety of possible approaches to machine learning music creation 168 will make
it difficult to develop universally applicable, bright-line standards in this field.

Id.
See Shirley Halperin, Study: Nashville, New York, L.A. Among America’s Most
Music-Centric Cities; Detroit, Philadelphia Lag Behind, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Aug.
7, 2012), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/earshot/study-music-scenes-nashville-newyork-los-angeles-detroit-358889 (finding Nashville and Los Angeles among the top five
most music-centric cities, based on an analysis of regional concentrations of “musicians,
music venues, and other industry businesses.”).
165 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2 (1971) (seeking to curtail the “unauthorized
reproduction and sale” of phonorecords) (emphasis added).
166 Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir.
2005) (interpreting Section 114(b) as granting the sound recording owner the “exclusive
right to ‘sample’ his own recording.”), with VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 883
(interpreting Section 114(b) as a limitation on the copyright holder’s rights).
167 See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 304–05 (2006) (citing Joanna
Demers, Sampling the 1970s in Hip-Hop, 22 POPULAR MUSIC 41, 41 (2003)) (defining
digital sampling as a “process in which pre-recorded sounds are incorporated into the sonic
fabric of a new song.”)
168 See Jones, supra note 20 (outlining a variety of neural networks-based approaches to
generative modeling).
163
164
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However, even if courts can agree on where AI music generators should be
situated within existing legal frameworks, there still remains the more
troubling matter of AI’s potential impact on human authorship and the creative
incentive structure. The technology’s near-limitless generative capacity, 169
compounded by an enthusiastic movement advocating for the copyrightability
of AI-made works, 170 places human authors and the music industry in a
precarious position. Thus, the rapid pace of AI development makes it essential
to articulate clear theories of infringement while the technology is still in its
nascent stages. In sum, AI’s seductive appeal must not distract courts and
policymakers from the ramifications of rules that effectively devalue
copyrighted works and the significance of human authorship. 171
Subsection A will describe how potential infringements in AI music
generator outputs would be assessed in light of the de minimis use case law
outlined in Part II. The subsection will consider GANs and autoencoder-based
approaches to AI music generation, demonstrating how application of de
minimis principles will lead to different outcomes, depending on the approach.
Subsection A will conclude by arguing that—regardless of the approach
taken—there are sound policy rationales for disapproving the unauthorized
reproduction of musical work and sound recording fragments in AI music
generator outputs. Finally, subpart B will propose policy alternatives that seek
to reconcile the competing interests of AI developers and music copyright
owners.
A. Infringement
Every sample used to construct an AI-generated song will implicate both
music copyrights. The various sound recording samples that constitute the AI
generator’s outputs are inextricably tied to their underlying musical works,
even if such uses are merely incidental. 172 Therefore, two infringement
169 See Dani Deahl, How AI-Generated Music is Changing the Way Hits Are Made,
VERGE (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/31/17777008/artificialintelligence-taryn-southern-amper-music (describing a recording that the AI music app
Amper produced within a minute of being instructed to do so, and the “unnerving” thought
that algorithms can make songs “in minutes”).
170 See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 10, at 400 (advocating for vestment of ownership rights in
non-human authors).
171 See Dani Deahl, supra note 169 (speculating on the implications of “AI getting in on
creative turf we categorize as distinctly human” to propose the question, “what does [AI
music’s progress] mean for human musicians?”).
172 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the case
involved “use of a sound recording of a performance of th[e] composition[,]” indicating that
every use of a recorded musical work performance will necessarily implicate the underlying
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analyses must be conducted for each sample: one for the musical work and
another for the sound recording. 173
The samples will manifest in the output to varying degrees—some might be
obvious, whereas others could constitute even less than the .23-second horn
blast at issue in Ciccone. 174 Thus, ascertaining which samples are engaged,
and whether such uses have been done to an unfair extent will guide the
infringement inquiries. 175 As the subsection that follows will demonstrate, the
threshold of an unfair appropriation will vary from sample to sample, with
several key variables influencing the outcome. Although this analytical
framework may be the truest method of assessing AI music in light of
established precedent, there is more at stake here than the mere
misappropriation of any given musical work or sound recording. In the final
analysis, courts and policymakers must also think critically about the future of
AI music to ensure that the forest is not missed for the trees.
1.

AI Music Generator Outputs Under De Minimis Use Precedent

The infringement analysis for musical work samples that appear in AI music
generator outputs is consistent with the copyright law’s general approach to de
minimis inquiries. 176 The musical work samples are assessed for their
appreciable compositional qualities, 177 and the inquiry is confined to only
those elements covered by the copyright in the musical work (i.e., melodies,
rhythms, harmonies, and other structural aspects fixed in the score). 178
Ultimately, if the samples are found to be quantitatively and qualitatively
insubstantial—i.e., unrecognizable to an average audience as having been
derived from their original sources—then they will be deemed non-infringing

musical work copyright).
173 See id. (acknowledging that an infringement analysis for a sound recording is distinct
from the analysis for a composition).
174 See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 879–81 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting the
different pieces of the work that constitute infringements, including a .23-second horn
blast).
175 See Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193 (noting that “‘[e]ven where there is some copying, . . .
it must be shown that this has been done to an unfair extent.’”) (quoting West Publ’g Co. v.
Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1909)).
176 See Bracha, supra note 62, at 158–69 (tracing the de minimis exception’s history and
examining the ways in which courts have come to treat the doctrine as an alternate label for
improper appropriation).
177 See Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2004) (filtering out the recording’s
performative aspects from consideration in the infringement inquiry, because the
composition was the sole basis for the plaintiff’s claim).
178 See id. at 1196 (adjudging the defendants’ use de minimis because the three sampled
notes lacked any “distinct melodic, harmonic, rhythmic or structural elements.”).
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de minimis uses. 179
Musical works are inherently less dynamic than sound recordings. When an
AI generator creates a song, it primarily does so by mining the sound recording
for its performative nuances, rather than for the generic compositional
structures in the musical work. 180 To be clear, the AI model does analyze the
musical works during training, generating valuable insights into how various
styles of music are composed. 181 However, comparatively little unique
musical work value will manifest in the generator’s output, because the AI
songs are constructed using short sound recording samples, which are by their
nature more qualitatively dense than the associated segments of their
underlying musical works. 182
Therefore, it is unlikely that a meaningful percentage of these musical work
samples, standing alone, will be recognizable to average audiences.
Nonetheless, Newton demonstrates that de minimis musical work analyses
must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, as the various outcomes will turn
on the unique facts of each use. 183 Indeed, there may be plenty of instantly
recognizable musical work segments that would conjure thoughts of the source
work, even if the listener is merely provided with a generic rendition of the
short sample’s notes, rhythm, and/or lyric(s). 184 Simply put, only a holistic
assessment of the individual musical work sample can determine the extent to
which the original work was misappropriated.
The infringement analysis for sound recording samples is less
straightforward and will turn on a number of key variables. First, it is
important to determine whether the AI generator fixes its music independently,
179 See id. (finding Beastie Boys’ use of Newton’s sample to be de minimis because “an
average audience would not discern Newton’s hand as a composer, . . . from Beastie Boys’
use of the sample.”).
180 See Jukebox, supra note 46 (describing how recent AI music generators correct for
prior models’ inability to “capture human voices or . . . subtle timbres, dynamics, and
expressivity” by “model[ing] music directly as raw audio.”).
181 See id. (explaining how variational autoencoders encode music at multiple levels,
including one which retains “only the essential musical information.”).
182 See, e.g., Newton, 388 F.3d at 1194 (highlighting the ways in which the plaintiff went
“beyond the score in his performance” to “emphasize the upper partials of the flute’s
complex harmonic tone,” which “is not explicitly requested in the score.”).
183 See id. (failing to establish a bright line de minimis use standard that would negate
the need for a holistic analysis based on the facts of a given case).
184 See Jukebox, supra note 46 (providing examples of the Jukebox app’s “completions”
function, through which the model generates a novel ending to a given song using the first
twelve seconds of the original audio as a primer). For the first twelve seconds in a
completion function, the source work is reproduced in its original form; from there, it is
manipulated by the model to produce a novel ending, which often requires reproduction of
the work’s recognizable musical elements to appear authentic. See id. (demonstrating the
completion function using, e.g., The Eagles’ “Hotel California”).
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or if it relies upon manipulation of the actual copyrighted sounds. 185 For
example, GANs-based AI systems entail a generator neural network that
independently fixes the music in an attempt to outmaneuver the discriminator
neural network’s authenticity detector. 186 Alternatively, autoencoder-based
approaches entail manipulation of actual copyrighted sounds to generate the
music through the encoding and decoding process. 187 In other words, how the
AI system uses the copyrighted sound recordings will dictate the course of the
analysis.
If the AI system independently fixes the sounds that constitute the
generator’s output, then there is simply no infringement of the sound
recording. 188 The limitation on the copyright owner’s exclusive reproduction
right in Section 114(b) makes independent fixation a complete defense to a
sound recording infringement action. 189 This result may be no less disruptive
for copyright owners in the grand scheme, but programming the AI model to
somehow independently fix its output audio would ensure that, technically
speaking, the AI music generator will not infringe any sound recording
copyrights. 190
Conversely, if the AI system reproduces the actual sounds as output, then
the analysis would turn on whichever circuit’s rule the court opts, or is bound,
to follow. 191 In the Sixth Circuit, a copyrighted sound recording fragment
reproduced in an AI-generated work would be deemed an infringement,
regardless of the sample’s substantiality. 192 Here, Bridgeport’s bright-line rule
185 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (limiting the exclusive reproduction right for sound
recordings to “the actual sounds fixed in the recording.”).
186 Nicholson, supra note 25.
187 Autoencoder, supra note 30.
188 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799–800 (6th Cir.
2005) (noting that the statutory protections do not extend to those materials that are created
with wholly independent sounds, even if those sounds imitate the copyrighted sounds).
189 See id. at 800 (noting that “the world at large is free to imitate or simulate the creative
work fixed in a recording so long as an actual copy of the sound recording itself is not
made.”).
190 See id. at 799–800 (emphasizing how copyright protection for sound recordings does
not extend to imitations); see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir.
1988) (explaining that intent to imitate a sound recording is not relevant to the infringement
inquiry, because copyright in a sound recording extends only to duplication of the actual
sounds fixed in the recording); Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F.Supp.2d 869, 872 (E.D.
Mich. 2008) (granting summary judgment to defendants in a sound recording copyright
infringement suit, because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the sound recording was
duplicated).
191 Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 801–02 (holding all sound recording
appropriations to be copyright infringements, regardless of their substantiality); with VMG
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 880–81 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding there must be
substantial infringement on the copyrighted material for there to be legal recourse for
copyright infringement).
192 See Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d at 801–02 (holding all sound recording
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would serve to prioritize the interests of copyright owners over AI developers,
in recognition of the value derived from the appropriated sound recording. 193
Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit’s rule would require the court to conduct a
de minimis inquiry to ascertain whether the appropriation is recognizable to the
average audience. 194 The extent to which any given sample will manifest
recognizably as output is unclear, because AI music generators could
potentially utilize any number of sound recordings from their datasets to
construct a single work. 195 However, unlike the .23-second horn blast in
Ciccone, the source of which was deemed unrecognizable once transplanted
into “Vogue,” it is possible that AI-generated music could contain substantial
samples if, for example, the model over-emulates a particular cross-section of
its dataset. 196
Generative AI models that replicate their inputs are said to “overfit” their
training datasets. 197 AI developers generally seek to avoid overfitting. 198
However, some AI systems are deliberately developed for emulative
purposes. 199 For instance, consider OpenAI’s Jukebox app (“Jukebox”), which
is designed to “generate[] music, including rudimentary singing, as raw audio

appropriations to be copyright infringements, regardless of their substantiality).
193 See id. at 802 (explaining how samplers derive value from every appropriation,
regardless of substantiality, in the form of cost-savings, efficiency, inimitable artistic
quality, or some combination thereof).
194 See VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 881 (maintaining a de minimis exception for
sound recordings based on the notion that a copier does not benefit from another artist’s
expressive content if the public cannot recognize the appropriation).
195 See Jukebox, supra note 56 (describing the Jukebox app’s dataset as containing “1.2
million songs (600,000 of which are in English), paired with the corresponding lyrics and
metadata”).
196 See VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 883–84 (emphasizing that Congress’ intended
scope of protection, as set forth in a House Report on Section 114(b), includes “any
substantial portion” of the actual sounds) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976)).
197 See Tushar Gupta, Deep Learning: Overfitting, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (Feb. 12,
2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/deep-learning-overfitting-846bf5b35e24 (defining
overfitting as a machine learning phenomenon wherein an AI model learns about the detail
in its training data so well that it causes the output to perfectly mirror its inputs); see also
Abraham Khan, Generating Pokémon-Inspired Music from Neural Networks, TOWARDS
DATA SCIENCE (Dec. 14, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/generating-pokemoninspired-music-from-neural-networks-bc240014132 (describing overfitting in the context of
music generation as “caus[ing] the output to sound nearly identical to one or more of the
original songs.”).
198 See Gupta, supra note 197 (stating that “[o]verfitting is a major problem in neural
networks.”).
199 See, e.g., Vlad Alex (Merzmensch), JukeBox by OpenAI., TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE
(Nov. 6, 2020), https://towardsdatascience.com/jukebox-by-openai-2f73638b3b73
(highlighting examples of the Jukebox app’s impressively accurate AI-generated versions of
AC/DC and Nirvana recordings).
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in a variety of genres and artist styles.” 200 A cursory glance through Jukebox’s
sample library reveals thousands of recognizable appropriations. 201 Indeed, an
AI music emulator would not perform its primary function if an average
audience could not recognize what has been appropriated. 202
In sum, the outcome of a given infringement analysis will turn on several
factors, including which copyright is at issue, whether the new sounds were
independently fixed, which de minimis rule the particular court adopts, and
whether the sample’s source is recognizable to an average audience. Although
consideration of the foregoing offers courts a practicable methodology for
making sense of the copyright issues implicit in AI music generation, the
multitude of consequential variables in each analysis rules out the possibility of
establishing bright-line standards regarding generative AI systems. Therefore,
consideration of AI music’s broader consequences is warranted to ascertain
whether sui generis legal standards best serve the goals of copyright in this
domain. 203
2.

Future Implications

AI music generators are presently advertised as tools to supplement human
creativity. 204 However, anyone who has observed the pace of technological
advance over the past twenty years can envision a future in which generative
AI is more than a mere contrivance. AI thought-leaders are already
undertaking ambitious initiatives to further embed the technology into our
daily lives. 205 If taken to its logical extreme, AI could foreseeably produce

Jukebox, supra note 56.
See Jukebox Sample Explorer, OPENAI: BLOG, https://jukebox.openai.com/
?song=787941133 (last visited Mar. 27, 2021) (containing thousands of AI-rendered
recordings emulating popular artists and musical styles).
202 Cf. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining how “it would
seem contradictory to assert that copying for parodic purposes could be de minimis. A
parody is successful only if the audience makes the connection between the original and its
comic version.”).
203 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that
the Copyright Act must be construed in light of the Constitution’s goal of “stimulat[ing]
artistic creativity for the general public good[,]” when technological change renders the
Act’s literal terms ambiguous).
204 See Jukebox, OPENAI: BLOG (Apr. 30, 2020), https://openai.com/blog/jukebox/
(describing how OpenAI expects “human and model collaborations to be an increasingly
exciting creative space”) (emphasis added).
205 See Alex Johnson, Elon Musk Wants to Hook Your Brain Directly to Computers –
Starting Next Year, NBC NEWS: TECH (July 17, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/
tech/elon-musk-wants-hook-your-brain-directly-computers-starting-next-ncna1030631
(reporting on the AI research company Neuralink and its plans to create “symbiosis with
artificial intelligence” by implanting neural devices into the human brain).
200
201
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music more efficiently and intelligently than human authors. 206 This
prediction has sparked a fierce debate among musicians—some insisting that
AI will usher in a golden era of creativity, while others begrudgingly brace
themselves for what they believe to be human authorship’s inevitable
demise. 207
The debate over the future of AI music bears a striking resemblance to the
debate over digital sampling. Digital sampling democratized the public’s
capacity for creativity and paved the way for an artform that presently
generates more revenue for the music industry than any other genre. 208
Concurrently, digital sampling served to trivialize the value of musical training
and analog recording by allowing non-musicians to cheaply and easily create
fashionable, salable music. 209 Thus, it is not just shifting musical tastes driving
hip-hop to predominance in the market; it is also the ease of production and
low transaction costs enabled by digital sampling. 210
Similarly, AI could be a seed for human creativity. Musicians and nonmusicians alike would have unprecedented access to insights from all of
recorded music’s history and the means to produce immeasurable quantities of
aesthetically pleasing music at the push of a button. However, AI music that
can pass for human authorship would likely have a chilling effect on the
public’s willingness to pay a premium for human-made works. Even if we
concede that there are aspects of the human mind that AI could never fully
replicate, an innately cynical market would, on balance, likely prefer AI music
for its lower transaction costs. 211 Accordingly, it would be shortsighted to
assume that AI will have any less disruptive of an effect on the music industry

206 See Chow, supra note 42 (quoting the musician Grimes on her prediction that AI will
be “so much better at making art than us.”). This prediction is particularly noteworthy (and
somewhat ironic) because Grimes is married to Elon Musk – one of the foremost authorities
on AI.
207 Id.
208 See Patrick Ryan, Rap Overtakes Rock as the Most Popular Genre Among Music
Fans. Here’s Why., USA TODAY (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
life/music/2018/01/03/rap-overtakes-rock-most-popular-genre-among-music-fans-hereswhy/990873001/ (explaining that R&B/hip-hop surpassed rock as the most popular genre in
the U.S. in terms of total consumption in 2017).
209 See Eckhause, supra note 112, at 379 (describing how “[t]he way that music is
created . . . began to change . . . [i]n essence, anyone with a computer could be a
musician.”).
210 See id. at 380.
211 See Denise Cummins, This is What Happens When You Take Ayn Rand Seriously,
PBS: NEWSHOUR (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/column-this-iswhat-happens-when-you-take-ayn-rand-seriously (noting how “[m]odern economic theory”
is based on the notion that rational agents are self-interested, and a market is “a collection of
such rational agents, each of whom is also self-interested.”).
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than digital sampling did in the 1990s and beyond.
The judiciary’s patience and musicological acuity will be tested as copyright
owners turn to the courts for redress. In the short term, the court system will
be overwhelmed by countless infringement actions—reason enough to
question the utility of applying case-by-case, fact-specific copyright doctrines
to generative AI. 212 However, once AI music generators evolve to the point
that their outputs sound less like their inputs, and more like intelligently
composed original works, traditional notions of infringement that focus on an
appropriation’s substantiality will become insufficient to hold accountable
those who make undetectable—but no less violative—use of others’ works. 213
The unsettled question of whether AI generated works are copyrightable 214
will greatly influence how humans are forced to adapt. If AI-generated works
are deemed protectible, the technology’s capacity for unlimited expression
could turn composing and recording music into a veritable minefield of
potential infringement claims, thereby disincentivizing human authors from
creating at all. Even if AI-generated works are not deemed copyrightable, the
legions of AI works routinely thrust into the public domain could render
human authors uncompetitive in the market.
In sum, AI music’s promise veils a host of undesirable consequences. On
the surface, AI appears to directly serve the copyright system’s goal of
expression maximization. 215 However, the law’s low threshold for copyright
protection is designed to incentivize creativity that is decidedly human. 216
212 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005)
(arguing for a bright line sound recording infringement rule, because adopting a de minimis
analysis for digital samples would require “mental, musicological, and technological
gymnastics” across “hundreds of . . . cases involving different samples from different
songs”).
213 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 76, at § 13.03[A] (2020) (quoting Newton v.
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004)) (explaining that substantial similarity
between the original and allegedly copied works is “an essential element of actionable
copying” – “‘no legal consequences will follow from [copying] unless the copying is
substantial.’”).
214 Compare U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES § 306 (3d ed. 2017) (explicitly stating the Office’s policy against registering
non-human authored works), with Bridy, supra note 10, at 401 (justifying copyright
protection on behalf of non-human authors, because copyright seeks to protect economic
rights, not moral rights).
215 See David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004)
(describing the copyright system’s primary aim as “promoting production of expression,”
which justifies many fundamental copyright doctrines, including the copyright term, and
various limitations on the exclusive rights); see also Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and
Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 433 (2007) (noting that the “primary way”
the Copyright Act achieves its ideal aims is by “providing creators with the incentive to
create and to distribute copies of their works to the public.”) (emphasis added).
216 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (limiting
copyright law and its protections to “original intellectual conceptions of the author,”
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Thus, AI’s capacity to supplant human authorship should give us pause to
reconsider encouraging its unfettered progress. The next subsection will
contemplate ways in which policymakers may strike an equitable balance
between the competing interests of AI developers, copyright owners, and
society at large.
B. Policy Proposals
If we concede, arguendo, that there is scientific and creative utility to AI
systems capable of producing music as intelligently as humans, then we must
be careful not to unduly restrict AI’s progress in the name of safeguarding
authors’ rights. Equitable doctrines such as the de minimis exception were
intended to achieve this delicate balance on an analytical level, but appear
woefully inadequate to do so in light of generative AI’s unique functionality
and long-term ramifications. 217 To be certain, AI developers would also be
able (and likely) to assert fair use over their sampling practices. 218 However,
fair use’s equally fact-specific nature, and its overlap with factors already
contemplated in the de minimis inquiry (e.g., substantiality of the portion
used), make it unlikely that fair use will yield appreciably different outcomes
or thread the needle of competing interests any more effectively. 219
Musicians typically begin composing and performing at an early age, when
notions of their art’s commercial viability are often subordinate to the simple
desire for a creative outlet. This attitude persists among many musicians who
are usually happy—indeed, flattered—to see their styles widely imitated; that
is, until the artistic validation fails to yield a proportional financial return. 220
Sadly, recognition is not always tied to pecuniary benefit in the music
business, and it cannot sustain the musician who requires financial security to

implying a need for the human element in a copyrightable work).
217 Francesco Di Cosmo, Return of the De Minimis Exception in Digital Music Sampling:
The Ninth Circuit’s Recent Holding in VMG Salsoul Improves Upon the Sixth Circuit’s
Holding in Bridgeport, But Raises Questions of its Own, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 227, 228, n.12
(2017) (“The de minimis defense is applicable when a defendant’s copying was so small and
trivial that it should be allowed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
218 Jessica Gillotte, Copyright Infringement in AI-Generated Artworks, 53 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 2655, 2684 (2020).
219 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (articulating factors to be considered in fair use analyses, which
are closely tied to de minimis considerations, such as substantiality of the portion used, and
the use’s effect upon the potential market for the original work).
220 See PBS, Copyright Criminals, YOUTUBE (Jan. 30, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=5kN8hugndG8 (profiling influential percussionist Clyde Stubblefield, who
expressed bewilderment at the disparity between his great musical influence, and the
comparatively minimal dividends it has yielded).
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continue creating. 221 Accordingly, a mere right of attribution over samples
used in AI music generation— however merited—would be of little practical
value to copyright owners in this context. 222
Musicians are often deluded by the false belief that monetizing art is at odds
with creative ethics and ideals. An irony of the backlash to Bridgeport’s
exhortation against unlicensed sampling was encapsulated in the Sixth
Circuit’s insightful recognition that attitudes often “appear driven by whose ox
is being gored.” 223 The same rules that samplers bemoan for supposedly
inhibiting creativity are amongst the strongest safeguards they may have
against exploitation of their own works. 224 Thus, notions of artistic purity and
ownership rights need not be viewed as mutually exclusive. 225
Licensing skeptics also argue that the fees are prohibitive, but this is not
necessarily the case. 226 The Ninth Circuit noted in its opinion in Newton that
Beastie Boys licensed the sample at issue for a mere “one-time fee of
$1,000.” 227 The Beastie Boys’ album Check Your Head, which contained the
sample from Newton on the track “Pass the Mic,” peaked at number ten on the
US Billboard 200 in 1992, indicating sales figures that would more than justify
the $1,000 expense. 228 Further, licensing rates set according to fair market
value reflect the notion that copyright owners merely seek fair compensation
for use of their works. 229 Indeed, an author who refuses to license would serve
neither the copyright system’s nor his own interests. Thus, a workable
licensing scheme is, on balance, the best available solution to the AI music
dilemma. 230
Nominal rates from work to work notwithstanding, the process of licensing
221 See ANVIL! THE STORY OF ANVIL (2008) (documenting the misadventures of the aging
Canadian heavy metal band Anvil, which has struggled for decades to obtain financial
success commensurate with the band’s influence in its genre).
222 Deahl, supra note 12.
223 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 804 (6th Cir. 2005)
224 See id. (noting that “today’s sampler is tomorrow’s samplee.”).
225 Deahl, supra note 12.
226 See PBS, supra note 220 (profiling seminal figures in hip-hop and digital sampling
who lament the copyright laws’ prohibition against “musical borrowing”).
227 Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 2003), amended, 388 F.3d 1189,
1191 (9th Cir. 2004).
228 Chart History: Beastie Boys, BILLBOARD, https://www.billboard.com/music/BeastieBoys/chart-history/TLP (last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
229 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV.
1745, 1791 (2012) (explaining that “[e]mpirical work . . . shows that . . . creators are willing
to reduce significantly the amount of money they are willing to accept to license their
intellectual property rights.”); see also How to Get Copyright Permission?, COPYRIGHT
ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance.org/faqs/how-to-get-copyright-permission/ (last visited
Mar. 13, 2020) (stating that payment for copyright permission varies based on factors like
usage, type of copyright, and exposure of work).
230 Chow, supra note 42.
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hundreds of thousands of works would be expensive, not to mention grossly
inefficient. Therefore, one solution is to establish a blanket licensing apparatus
for AI music generator training and output. AI developers—as well as other
unforeseen parties looking to use numerous works in the future —would have
a one-stop shop for securing the rights to any works included under the blanket
license. This model has been a longstanding practice in the music publishing
industry, which utilizes blanket licensing to grant public performance
permissions to various users on behalf of hundreds of thousands of authors. 231
Licensees would benefit from the system’s efficiency, and potential licensors
would retain the right to control the inclusion or exclusion of their works. On
balance, blanket licensing would ensure that neither party’s proverbial ox is
gored in the making of an AI song.
Another potential solution is to restrict the AI model’s permissible pool of
training data to works in the public domain and those voluntarily pledged to
the system by copyright owners. Many musicians have expressed tremendous
enthusiasm for AI music and have committed themselves to ensuring the
technology is accessible to all. 232 Those who wish to see their works included
in the AI system can grant permission through organizations like Creative
Commons, 233 which assist copyright owners with open licensing and
dedicating their works to the public domain. Naturally, this would drastically
narrow the AI system’s field of possible training data, thereby diminishing the
quality of its outputs. Nonetheless, courts and policymakers must again ask
whether AI music outputs that can pass for human authorship constitute the
type of socially beneficial end that the copyright system seeks to incentivize.
In light of the havoc that unchecked generative AI could wreak on human
authorship, there are sound utilitarian justifications for not prioritizing the
technology’s development over intellectual property rights and the human
incentive structure. Perhaps a less authentic-sounding AI music generator in
the short term is simply the price society must pay to preserve the dignity of
human authorship for the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
AI has captivated the world.

Far from Hollywood’s depiction of

231 See, e.g., ASCAP Music Licensing, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/ (last visited
Mar. 13, 2021) (outlining the various categories of businesses to which performance rights
organizations provide blanket licenses).
232 Chow, supra note 42.
233 Open Access to Knowledge is Critical—Especially During a Global Health
Emergency, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2021)
(creating a platform for artists to share, use, and remix other works).
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emotionally intelligent robots, AI is merely a broad classification used to
describe the field of computer science research that deals with a machine’s
capacity to replicate human thought processes. Nonetheless, the technology
has tremendous potential to transform the way we think about tasks that have
historically been considered innately human. Aesthetically pleasing AI music
generation is now possible thanks to advances in the subfield of AI research
known as machine learning, which utilizes clusters of algorithms called neural
networks to interpret and manipulate music in a variety of ways. This
phenomenon has copyright owners rightfully concerned, as AI music generator
outputs are veritable collages of fine-grained sound recording samples.
AI music generator outputs are peculiar subjects for infringement inquiries,
because the copyrighted works at issue may only manifest to a slight extent, if
at all. Thus, courts are likely to interpret potential infringements in AI music
generator outputs based on de minimis principles, which seek to draw the line
between trivial and unfair appropriations. The line of de minimis use cases
regarding digital sampling is instructive. 234 Digital sampling emerged in the
1980s and proceeded to revolutionize the way music was produced and
consumed. 235 Courts have struggled to settle on a consistent interpretation of
the Copyright Act with respect to de minimis uses of sound recordings,
resulting in an unfortunate circuit split between two of the nation’s primary
music markets. 236
Further, de minimis analyses of musical work
appropriations, which have become increasingly common in light of digital
sampling’s ascendancy, entail highly fact-specific inquiries that are sure to test
the musicological capabilities of courts and litigants in the years to come. 237
It is unlikely that Congress anticipated digital sampling’s ubiquity, much
less AI music’s variety of digital sampling, when it last overhauled the
Copyright Act in 1976. 238 Nevertheless, de minimis case law provides a
practicable framework in which courts may assess generative AI’s outputs.
However, de minimis principles are insufficient to account for the antiutilitarian ramifications of permitting this novel technology. Chief among
234 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2016); Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 797–84 (6th Cir. 2005); Newton v.
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–96 (9th Cir. 2004); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2
(9th Cir. 1986).
235 Dean Garfield, Kembrew McLeod & Hank Shocklee, Digital Music Sampling:
Creativity or Criminality?, NPR (Jan. 28, 2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/01/28/
133306353/Digital-Music-Sampling-Creativity-Or-Criminality.
236 Compare VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 875, with Bridgeport Music, Inc., 410 F.3d
at 797.
237 Bracha, supra note 62, at 158–69 (2018) (noting that the history of de minimis
analyses in copyright decisions “has often been opaque, cryptic or even incoherent.”).
238 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2 (1971) (evidencing Congress’ rationale for amending
the Copyright Act).
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these consequences is the chilling effect that AI could have on human
authorship. Humans may find themselves helpless to compete in the market
against the AI systems of tomorrow, which generate their wealth of musical
know-how from the same human authors they are likely to displace.
Accordingly, courts and policymakers must consider equitable, licensing-based
solutions to promote a mutually beneficial AI music ecosystem for technology
companies and copyright owners alike. AI may indeed someday change how
music is created and consumed for the better, but we must take care not to
disregard the significance of the human element in our haste to realize
technology’s promise for the future.

